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ABSTRACT
We study the optimal design of unemployment insurance for workers sampling job opportu-
nities over time. We focus on the optimal timing of beneﬁts and the desirability of allowing
workers to freely access a riskless asset. When workers have constant absolute risk aversion
preferences, it is optimal to use a very simple policy: a constant beneﬁt during unemploy-
ment, a constant tax during employment that does not depend on the duration of the spell,
and free access to savings using a riskless asset. Away from this benchmark, for constant
relative risk aversion preferences, the welfare gains of more elaborate policies are minus-
cule. Our results highlight two largely distinct roles for policy toward the unemployed: (a)
ensuring workers have suﬃcient liquidity to smooth their consumption; and (b) providing
unemployment beneﬁts that serve as insurance against the uncertain duration of unemploy-
ment spells.
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System.1 Introduction
There is wide variation in the duration of unemployment beneﬁts across OECD countries
(Figure 1). In Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, beneﬁts last for six months.
In Germany beneﬁts lapse after one year and in France after ﬁve years. In Belgium they last
forever. Which country has the right policy?
A standard argument for terminating beneﬁts after a few quarters is that extending
the duration of beneﬁts lengthens the duration of jobless spells (Katz and Meyer, 1990).
But beneﬁts also provide insurance and help workers maintain smooth consumption while
unemployed (Gruber, 1997). Determining which policy is best requires a dynamic model
of optimal unemployment insurance. Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997) develop such models and show that beneﬁts should optimally decline during a jobless
spell. Many economists have interpreted these results as broadly supportive of the Italian,
British, and American version of unemployment insurance. But they hinge on some subtle
assumptions, notably a restriction that the unemployed can neither borrow nor save and
so consume their beneﬁts in each period. This means that unemployment beneﬁts play a
dual role: they insure workers against uncertainty in the prospect of ﬁnding a job, and they
provide workers with the ability to smooth consumption while unemployed.
In this paper, we reexamine the optimal timing of beneﬁts, distinguishing the two roles
by allowing the worker to borrow and save. Our main conclusion is that when workers
have suﬃcient liquidity, in either assets or capacity to borrow, a constant beneﬁt schedule
of unlimited duration is optimal or nearly optimal.1 The constant beneﬁt schedule insures
against unemployment risk, while workers’ ability to dissave or borrow allows them to avoid
temporary drops in consumption.
Our results suggest two conceptually distinct roles for policy toward the unemployed.
First, ensuring that workers have suﬃcient liquidity to smooth their consumption; and sec-
ond, providing constant unemployment beneﬁts that serve as insurance against the un-
certain duration of unemployment spells. This dichotomy is consistent with the spirit of
Feldstein and Altman’s (1998) recent policy proposal for unemployment insurance savings
accounts (see also Feldstein, 2005).
We represent the unemployed worker’s situation using McCall’s (1970) model of sequential
1This does not necessarily imply that the Belgian policy is optimal. Policies diﬀer along other dimensions,
notably in the maximum yearly beneﬁt; see OECD (2002), Table 2.2. This paper focuses on the optimal
duration of beneﬁts. In ongoing work for a separate paper, we examine the determinants of the optimal
level.



































































































































































































Figure 1: Duration of unemployment beneﬁts in select OECD countries. Source: OECD
Beneﬁts and Wages 2002, Table 2.2. ∗Duration is unlimited in Belgium.
job search. Each period, a risk-averse, inﬁnitely lived unemployed worker gets a wage oﬀer
from a known distribution. If she accepts the oﬀer, she keeps the job at a constant wage
forever. If she rejects it, she searches again the following period.
Our main purpose is to compare two unemployment insurance policies. We begin by
considering a simple insurance policy, constant beneﬁts, where the worker receives a constant
beneﬁt while she is unemployed and pays a constant tax once she is employed. The worker
can borrow and lend using a riskless bond. We show that the worker adopts a constant
reservation wage although her assets and consumption decline during a jobless spell. The
reservation wage is increasing in both the unemployment beneﬁt and the employment tax, a
form of moral hazard. An insurance agency sets the level of beneﬁts and taxes to minimize
the cost of providing the worker with a given level of utility.
We then consider optimal unemployment insurance. An insurance agency dictates a
duration-dependent consumption level for the unemployed, funded by an employment tax
that depends on the length of the jobless spell. The worker has no access to capital markets
and so must consume her after-tax income in each period. Absent direct monitoring of
wage oﬀers or randomization schemes, this is the best insurance system possible. The path
of unemployment consumption and employment taxes determines the worker’s reservation
wage, which the insurance agency cannot directly control. It sets this path to minimize the
2cost of providing the worker with a given level of utility.
Our main result is that with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences and no
lower bound on consumption, constant beneﬁts and optimal unemployment insurance are
equivalent. That is, the cost of providing the worker with a given level of utility is the same,
her reservation wage is the same, and the path of her consumption is the same under both
insurance systems. In both cases consumption falls by a constant amount each period that
the worker is unemployed, both during and after the unemployment spell. When the worker
can borrow and save, this is consistent with a constant beneﬁt and tax.
Our result that the optimal unemployment insurance can do no better than constant
beneﬁts with borrowing and savings contrasts with a large literature on the need for savings
constraints in dynamic moral hazard models.2 Rogerson (1985) considers an environment in
which a risk-averse worker must make a hidden eﬀort decision that aﬀects her risk-neutral










where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available at date t. In
particular, since the function 1/x is convex,
u
′(ct) < Etβ(1 + r)u
′(ct+1).
An individual facing this path of consumption would consume less today and more tomorrow
and hence is “savings-constrained” by optimal insurance. In contrast, in our model a worker
confronted with the optimal unemployment insurance policy satisﬁes this Euler condition
with equality.
We also explore optimal insurance with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) prefer-
ences. We do this for two reasons. First, CRRA preferences are theoretically more appealing
than CARA preferences. We want to explore the robustness of our ﬁndings to this assump-
tion. And second, this introduces a nonnegativity constraint on consumption that limits a
worker’s debt to the amount that she can repay even in the worst possible state of the world,
Aiyagari’s (1994) natural borrowing limit. We highlight an interesting interaction between
2A recent example is Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), who emphasize that capital taxation
may discourage saving. Allen (1985) and Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) provide a particularly striking exam-
ple of the cost of unobserved savings in a dynamic economy with asymmetric information. They prove that
if a worker privately observes her income and has access to a hidden saving technology, then no insurance is
possible.
3a worker’s ability to borrow and optimal insurance.
The perfect equivalence between optimal unemployment insurance and constant beneﬁts
breaks down with CRRA preferences, but we ﬁnd that our results with CARA provide an
important benchmark. As in the CARA case, optimal unemployment insurance dictates a
declining path of consumption for unemployed workers and an increasing tax upon reemploy-
ment. However, the implicit subsidy to unemployment, the amount that a worker’s expected
lifetime transfer from the insurance agency rises if she stays unemployed for an additional
period, increases very slowly during a jobless spell.
By its very deﬁnition, constant beneﬁts are always at least as costly as optimal insurance.
But if the worker has enough liquidity so as to have a minimal chance of approaching any
lower bound on assets, the additional cost of constant beneﬁts is minuscule, less than 10−7
weeks (or about 0.01 seconds) of income in our leading example. The diﬀerence between the
optimal time-varying and time-invariant subsidy is also very small.
If the worker is near her debt limit, the diﬀerence between constant beneﬁts and optimal
unemployment insurance is larger. This is because beneﬁts are forced to play the dual role of
providing insurance and smoothing consumption. However, using beneﬁts to create liquidity
in this indirect way is likely to be less eﬃcient than measures designed to address the liquidity
problem directly.
The general message that emerges from our model is that unemployment insurance policy
should be simple—a constant beneﬁt and tax, combined with measures to ensure that workers
have the liquidity to maintain their consumption level during a jobless spell. Our intuition
for these results is the following. With CARA utility the fall in assets and consumption that
occurs during an unemployment spell does not aﬀect attitudes toward risk; as a consequence,
the optimal unemployment subsidy is constant. With CRRA utility, the worker becomes
more risk averse as consumption falls; this explains why the optimal subsidy increases over
time. However, this wealth eﬀect is small during a typical, or even relatively prolonged,
unemployment spell provided the worker is able to smooth her consumption.
Before proceeding, we note that our use of a sequential search model departs from
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and many others, which assumes that there is only a job
search eﬀort decision.3 There are three reasons for this modeling choice. First, our model
produces stark results on optimal policy in a straightforward way, which we believe is in-
3Shavell and Weiss (1979) allow for both hidden search eﬀort and hidden wage draws. See also exer-
cise 21.3 in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). However, both of these models assume that employed workers
cannot be taxed, and neither examines optimal beneﬁts when workers have access to liquidity.
4trinsically useful. On the other hand, the sequential search model is not critical for these
results. Indeed, the paper most closely related to ours is Werning (2002), which introduces
hidden borrowing and savings into the Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) search eﬀort model,
and some of his results are analogous to ones we report here. For example, he proves that
constant beneﬁts and taxes are optimal under CARA preferences if the cost of search is
monetary. Despite this, and in contrast to our results here, in Werning (2002) constant
beneﬁts are not equivalent to optimal unemployment insurance, even with CARA utility,
since it is always desirable to exclude the worker from the asset market.
Second, the sequential search model is empirically relevant. Starting with the work of
Feldstein and Poterba (1984), a number of authors have documented that an increase in
unemployment beneﬁts raises workers’ reservation wage and consequently reduces the rate
at which they ﬁnd jobs. The sequential search model is a natural one for thinking about this
fact. Third, the sequential search model is the backbone of most research on equilibrium
unemployment. At the heart of the Lucas and Prescott (1974) equilibrium search model and
of versions of the Pissarides (1985) matching model with heterogeneous ﬁrms are individual
sequential search problems. More recently, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) examine a large
economy in which each individual engages in sequential job search from an exogenous wage
distribution.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model’s environment and the two
policies we consider. Section 3 then establishes the equivalence between the two systems un-
der CARA preferences. Section 4 quantitatively evaluates optimal unemployment insurance
and optimal constant beneﬁts with CRRA preferences, highlighting the relationship between
unemployment insurance and liquidity. Section 5 concludes.
2 Two Policies for the Unemployed
We begin by describing the common physical environment of the model. We then discuss
the two policies we consider, constant beneﬁts and optimal unemployment insurance.
2.1 The Unemployed Worker







5where β < 1 represents the discount factor and u(c) is the increasing, concave period utility
function.
At the start of each period, a worker can be employed at a wage w or unemployed.
A worker employed at w produces w units of the consumption good in each period; she
never leaves her job. An unemployed worker receives a single independent wage draw from
the cumulative distribution function F.4 Let w ≥ 0 denote the lower bound of the wage
distribution. The worker observes the wage and decides whether to accept or reject it. If
she accepts w, she is employed and produces w units of the consumption good in the current
and all future periods. If she rejects w, she produces nothing and is unemployed at the start
of the next period. In either case, the worker decides how much to consume at the end of
the period, after observing the wage draw. The worker cannot recall past wage oﬀers.
We assume that an unemployment agency only observes whether the worker is employed
or unemployed. In particular, it does not observe the worker’s wage, even after she decides
to take a job.5 The objective of the unemployment insurance agency is to minimize the cost
of providing the worker with a given level of utility. We assume costs are discounted at rate
r = β−1 − 1.
2.2 Policy I: Constant Beneﬁts
The policy we call constant beneﬁts is deﬁned by a constant unemployment beneﬁt ¯ b, a
constant employment tax ¯ τ, and perfect access to a riskless asset with net return r = β−1−1,
subject to a no-Ponzi-game condition.6
Since the worker’s problem is stationary, we present it recursively. Start by considering
a worker who is employed at wage w and has assets a with budget constraint a′ = (1+r)a+
w − ¯ τ − c. Since β(1 + r) = 1, she consumes her after tax-income plus the interest on her
assets ce(a,w) = ra + w − ¯ τ, so that assets are kept constant, a′ = a. This means that her
4We assume that F is continuous and has ﬁnite expectation and that there is some chance of drawing a
positive wage, so F(w) < 1 for some w > 0.
5If the wage were observable, an unemployment insurance agency could tax employed workers 100 percent
and redistribute the proceeds as a lump-sum transfer. Workers would be indiﬀerent about taking a job and
hence would follow any instructions on which wages to accept or reject. This makes it feasible to obtain
the ﬁrst best, complete insurance with the maximum possible income. Private information is a simple way
to prevent the ﬁrst best, but other modeling assumptions could also make the ﬁrst best unattainable, e.g.,
moral hazard among employed workers.
6That is, debt must grow slower than the interest rate, limt→∞(1 + r)−tat ≥ 0, with probability one,
where at denotes asset holdings. Together with the sequence of intertemporal budget constraints, this is
equivalent to imposing a present-value lifetime budget constraint, with probability one.
6lifetime utility is
Ve(a,w; ¯ τ) =
u(ra + w − ¯ τ)
1 − β
. (1)
Next consider an unemployed worker with assets a and let Vu(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) denote her expected
lifetime utility, given policy parameters ¯ b and ¯ τ. This must satisfy the Bellman equation









′;¯ b, ¯ τ)
￿
,




where a′ = (1 + r)a +¯ b − c. An unemployed worker chooses whether to accept a job or not.
If she does take the job, her utility is given by Ve(a,w; ¯ τ) in equation (1). Otherwise, she
collects unemployment beneﬁts ¯ b, consumes c and saves a′ in the current period, and remains
unemployed into the next period, obtaining expected continuation utility Vu(a′;¯ b, ¯ τ).
The solution to the Bellman equation deﬁnes the worker’s unemployment consumption
cu(a), reservation wage ¯ w(a), and next period’s assets a′(a), conditional on this period’s
assets. Given these objects, the cost of the unemployment insurance system is deﬁned
recursively by
S(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) =
￿
¯ b +
S(a′(a);¯ b, ¯ τ)
1 + r
￿
F( ¯ w(a)) −
(1 + r)¯ τ
￿




A worker with assets a fails to ﬁnd a job with probability F(¯ w(a)). In this event, the cost
of the unemployment insurance system is the unemployment beneﬁt ¯ b plus the discounted
continuation cost S(a′). If she ﬁnds a job, the present value of her tax payments is
(1+r)¯ τ
r .
An unemployment insurance agency chooses ¯ b and ¯ τ to maximize the worker’s utility
given some available resources and an initial asset level. Equivalently, we consider the dual
problem of minimizing the total resource cost of delivering a certain utility for the worker.
The optimal constant beneﬁt policy solves Cc(v0,a) ≡ min¯ b,¯ τ S(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) + (1 + r)a subject to
Vu(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) = v0.
Since there are no ad hoc constraints on borrowing, a standard Ricardian equivalence
argument implies that V (a;¯ b, ¯ τ) = V (a+x;¯ b−rx, ¯ τ +rx). The same is true with total cost,
so it follows that Cc(v0,a) is independent of a. Abusing notation we write Cc(v0).
72.3 Policy II: Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Under optimal unemployment insurance, a worker who is unemployed in period t consumes
bt, while a worker who ﬁnds a job in period t pays a tax τt, depending on when she ﬁnds a
job, for the remainder of her life. One can conceive of more complicated insurance policies
where the agency asks the worker to report her wage draws, advises her on whether to take
the job, and makes payments conditional on the worker’s entire history of reports. That
is, one can model unemployment insurance as a revelation mechanism in a principal-agent
problem. We prove in Appendix A that the policy we consider here does as well as any
deterministic mechanism as long as absolute risk aversion is non-increasing.
Given {bt} and {τt}, consider a worker who chooses a sequence of reservation wages { ¯ wt}.























The worker is unemployed at the start of period t with probability
Qt−1
s=0 F( ¯ ws). If she draws
a wage below ¯ wt, she rejects it and her period utility is u(bt). If she draws a wage above ¯ wt,
she takes the job and gets utility u(w − τt) each period, forever.
Now consider an unemployment insurance agency that sets the sequence of unemployment

















τt(1 − F(¯ wt))
￿
, (5)
subject to two constraints. First, the worker’s utility must equal v0 if she uses the rec-




. And second, she must do at







{ ˆ ¯ wt,bt,τt}
￿
. That is, the agency recognizes that the worker will choose
her reservation wage sequence { ¯ wt} to maximize her utility given {bt,τt}. The solution to
this problem describes optimal unemployment beneﬁts.
It is useful to express this problem recursively. The cost function deﬁned above must

























u( ¯ w − τ)
1 − β
. (8)
Moreover, the optimal sequence { ¯ wt,bt,τt} must be generated by the Bellman equation’s
policy functions.
An unemployed worker starts the period with some promised utility v. The agency
chooses consumption for the unemployed b, the tax τ it will collect on workers who become
employed in the current period, the worker’s continuation utility if she remains unemployed
v′, and the reservation wage ¯ w in order to minimize its cost. If the worker gets an oﬀer below
the reservation wage, then the cost is the unemployment consumption b plus the discounted
cost of delivering continuation utility v′ in the next period. If instead the worker ﬁnds a
job above the reservation wage, then the agency’s costs are reduced by the present value of
taxes. Equation (7) imposes that the policy must deliver utility v to the worker. Finally,
equation (8) is the incentive constraint, which incorporates the fact that the worker sets her
reservation wage at the point of indiﬀerence between accepting and rejecting the wage.
3 Equivalence for a Benchmark: CARA Utility
There are two disadvantages to constant beneﬁts relative to optimal unemployment insur-
ance. First, there is a restriction on the time path of unemployment beneﬁts and taxes, so
bt and τt are constant. Second, the planner does not directly control the worker’s consump-
tion and so is constrained by her savings choices. This can be thought of as an additional
dimension of moral hazard. In general, constant beneﬁts are more costly than optimal un-
employment insurance: Cc(v) ≥ C∗(v); however, in this section we prove analytically that
constant beneﬁts achieve the same outcome as optimal unemployment insurance for the case
with CARA preferences, u(c) = −exp(−ρc) with c ∈ R. A key feature is that there is no
limit on the amount of debt that workers can accrue and all workers have the same attitude
9towards lotteries over future wages, which makes the model particularly tractable. We later
show that these results provide a good benchmark for other preference speciﬁcations.
For the results in this section, it is convenient to deﬁne











the certainty equivalent for a worker of a lottery oﬀering the maximum of ¯ w and w ∼ F. The
CARA utility function has a convenient property that we exploit throughout this section,
u(c1 + c2) = −u(c1)u(c2) for any c1 and c2.
3.1 Constant Beneﬁts
We characterize constant beneﬁts in two steps. First, we characterize individual behavior
given unemployment beneﬁts ¯ b, employment taxes ¯ τ, and assets a. Then we discuss how to
choose these parameters optimally. It is convenient to deﬁne the net beneﬁt or unemployment
subsidy by ¯ B ≡ ¯ b + ¯ τ.
The ﬁrst step follows from solving the Bellman equation (2).
Proposition 1 Assume CARA preferences. The reservation wage, consumption and utility
of the unemployed satisfy
(1 + r) ¯ w = CE(¯ w) + r ¯ B. (10)
cu(a) = ra + ¯ w − ¯ τ (11)
Vu(a) =
u(ra − ¯ τ + CE( ¯ w))
1 − β
(12)
Proof. In Appendix B.
Equation (10) generalizes a standard equation for a risk-neutral worker’s reservation
wage, e.g., equation (6.3.3) in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), to an environment with risk
aversion and savings. It can be reexpressed as the condition that a worker is indiﬀerent
between accepting her net wage ¯ w − ¯ τ today and rejecting it, getting her unemployment
beneﬁt today, and then earning the certainty equivalent CE(¯ w) − ¯ τ thereafter:
¯ w − ¯ τ
1 − β
= ¯ b + β
CE( ¯ w) − ¯ τ
1 − β
.
Equation (10) indicates that the reservation wage ¯ w is increasing in the net unemployment
10subsidy ¯ B. This is the essence of the moral hazard problem in our model—the more one tries
to protect the worker against unemployment by raising unemployment beneﬁts and funding
the beneﬁts by an employment tax, the more selective she becomes. The equation also shows
that a worker’s assets a do not aﬀect her reservation wage, so it is constant during a spell of
unemployment.
Consumption in equation (11) has a permanent income form with a constant precaution-
ary savings component. Assets fall by ¯ w− ¯ B > 0 as long as there is some chance of getting a
wage in excess of the unemployment subsidy, F( ¯ B) < 1.7 Consumption falls by CE( ¯ w) − ¯ w
each period that the worker remains unemployed. Unemployed workers face uncertainty: a
wage draw above CE( ¯ w) is good news leading to an increase in consumption, while a wage
draw below CE( ¯ w) is bad news leading to a decline in consumption.
The next step is to minimize the cost of providing the worker with utility v0. Using the
result that the reservation wage is constant, equation (3) becomes




r¯ bF(¯ w) − (1 + r)¯ τ(1 − F(¯ w))
1 + r − F( ¯ w)
￿
, (13)
which is independent of a. Optimal constant beneﬁt policy minimizes S(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) + (1 + r)a
subject to (10) and (12).
Proposition 2 Assume CARA preferences. Then the optimal constant beneﬁts policy is
independent of v0. The reservation wage satisﬁes ¯ w∗ ∈ argmax ¯ w Φ( ¯ w), where
Φ( ¯ w) ≡
CE( ¯ w) − ¯ wF(¯ w)
1 + r − F( ¯ w)
, (14)












Proof. Use equations (10) and (12) to solve for ¯ b and ¯ τ as functions of ¯ w and v = Vu(a;¯ b, ¯ τ).
Substituting into the cost (13) delivers the desired result.
7Substitute equation (11) into the unemployed worker’s budget constraint to get a′ = a + ¯ B − ¯ w. If
¯ w ≤ ¯ B, condition (10) implies ¯ w ≥ CE( ¯ w). But the deﬁnition of the certainty equivalent (9) implies this is
possible only if F( ¯ w) = 1, a contradiction.
11Our next result characterizes the worker’s allocation given optimal policy. We take
current unemployment utility v as a state variable, express the allocation as a function of v,
and describe the evolution of v.
Proposition 3 Assume CARA preferences. Let v denote the utility promised to the unem-
ployed at the beginning of a period. Then if the agent remains unemployed, she consumes
cu(v) = ¯ w






and her utility evolves to
v
′(v) = −u( ¯ w
∗ − CE( ¯ w
∗))v. (17)
If she accepts a job at wage w, she forever after consumes






Proof. This follows directly by changing variables from a to v = Vu(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) using equa-
tions (11)–(12), ce(a,w) = ra + w − ¯ τ, and the budget constraint a′ = (1 + r)a + b − c.
This proposition will be useful when comparing constant beneﬁts with optimal unem-
ployment insurance, which we turn to now.
3.2 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
We characterize optimal unemployment insurance using the Bellman equation (6)–(8). To do
so, it is convenient to ﬁrst deduce the shape of the cost function directly from the sequence
problem.













Moreover, let { ¯ w∗
t,b∗
t,τ∗




t − x} with x ≡ u−1((1 − β)v0) is optimal for any other initial promise v0.
Proof. Let ˆ bt ≡ bt + x and ˆ τt ≡ τt − x for all t. Use equation (4) and CARA preferences to
show that adding a constant x to unemployment consumption in each period and subtracting
12the same constant x from the employment tax simply multiplies lifetime utility by the positive






{ ¯ w,ˆ b, ˆ τ}
￿
. The result follows immediately.
The optimal path for consumption shifts in parallel with promised utility, while the path
for the reservation wage is unchanged. The cost function reﬂects these two features. Indeed,
since promised utility is a state variable for the problem, the lemma implies that the optimal
reservation wage path will be constant. These results are implications of the absence of
wealth eﬀects with CARA preferences.
To solve the agency’s problem further, we substitute the cost function from (19) into (6)
and use the incentive constraint (8) to eliminate the employment tax τ. The Bellman



























¯ w − u
−1￿
(1 − β)(u(b) + βv
′)
￿￿






= −(u(b) + βv
′)u(CE( ¯ w) − ¯ w). (21)
The solution to this cost minimization problem must solve the subproblem of minimizing
the cost b+u−1((1−β)v′)/r of providing a given level of utility u(b)+βv′ to those remaining
unemployed. The ﬁrst order condition for this problem yields
(1 − β)v
′ = u(b) (22)
or equivalently u(b) + βv′ = u(b)/(1 − β). The promise keeping constraint (21) is then
equivalent to b = ¯ w − CE(¯ w). Substitute these conditions into the Bellman equation to












F(¯ w)¯ w − CE( ¯ w)





¯ w Φ( ¯ w), (23)
where Φ( ¯ w) is deﬁned by equation (14).
The optimal reservation wage ¯ w∗ is independent of promised utility and hence constant
over time. Substituting equation (23) into equation (19) proves that the cost to the agency
of providing a worker with utility v is identical to the cost with constant beneﬁts Cc(v) in
equation (15).
13Once we have found the optimal reservation wage ¯ w∗, the associated unemployment
consumption, employment tax and continuation utility fall out using equations (7), (8),
and (22) along with Lemma 1. The next proposition summarizes the main result of this
section.
Proposition 4 Assume CARA preferences. Under optimal unemployment insurance, the
reservation wage is constant over time and maximizes Φ( ¯ w), given by (14). If an agent
has expected utility v and remains unemployed, she consumes cu(v) (equation 16) and has
continuation utility v′(v) (equation 17). If she accepts a job at wage w, she consumes ce(v,w)
(equation 18) forever. This is the same allocation as under an optimal constant beneﬁt and
the cost is the same, Cc(v0) = C∗(v0).
Thus, when the worker can borrow and lend at the same rate as the agency, a very simple
policy attains the same allocation as optimal unemployment insurance. Of course, Ricardian
equivalence implies that the timing of transfers is not pinned down, only the net subsidy to
unemployment. If a worker takes a job in period t, she must pay taxes equal to
(1+r)τt
r in
present value terms. If she remains unemployed for one more period, she receives a beneﬁt
bt and then pays taxes
τt+1
r in present value terms. The sum of these is the unemployment
subsidy, a measure of insurance:







Using bt = cu(vt) and τt = w − ce(vt,w) with equations (16)–(18), we ﬁnd that Bt =
((1 + r) ¯ w∗ − CE( ¯ w))/r. The unemployment subsidy is constant and the same as ¯ B in the
problem with constant beneﬁts, given by equation (10).
At the other end of the spectrum from Ricardian equivalence, imagine a worker who
can neither borrow nor save and so lives hand-to-mouth consuming current income. In
this extreme case, beneﬁts and taxes are uniquely pinned down, as in Shavell and Weiss
(1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). One interpretation of this extreme case is that
it calls for decreasing beneﬁts and increasing taxes. However, it is equivalent to think of the
insurance agency simultaneously lending to the worker and providing her with a constant
unemployment subsidy. Conceptually, even in this case, it remains useful to distinguish
between these two components of policy.
144 Liquidity and Wealth Eﬀects: CRRA Utility
The sharp closed form results obtained so far were derived under an assumption of CARA
preferences and in particular allowed consumption to be negative. We now turn to workers
with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences with nonnegative constraint on
consumption. Let σ > 0 denote the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Then the period
utility function is u(c) = c1−σ
1−σ for σ  = 1, with u(c) = log(c) corresponding to risk aversion of
one.
We again consider our two alternative policies: optimal unemployment insurance and
constant beneﬁts. The equivalence between these two policies breaks down with CRRA pref-
erences. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd little welfare gain in moving from constant beneﬁts to optimal
unemployment insurance. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the optimal policy and allocations obtained
analytically with CARA provide an excellent approximation for our CRRA speciﬁcations.
For both reasons, we conclude that the CARA case is indeed a very useful benchmark.
4.1 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Optimal unemployment insurance solves the Bellman equation (6)–(8). The form of the
utility function is diﬀerent with CRRA preferences than with CARA preferences, and so the
analytical expression for the cost function in equation (19) no longer holds. We therefore
use numerical simulations to examine the economy.
To proceed we need to make choices for the discount factor β = (1+r)−1, the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion σ, and the wage distribution F(w). As in Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997), we view a period as representing a week and set β = 0.999, equivalent to an annual
discount factor of 0.949. We ﬁx the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at σ = 1.5 but later
consider the robustness of our results to a higher value, σ = 6.8
We adopt a Frechet wage distribution, F(w) = exp(−zw−θ) with support (0,∞), and
parameters z,θ > 0.9 With CRRA the parameter z acts as an uninteresting scaling factor,
8Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) use the much lower value of σ = 1/2 in their baseline calibration. They
argue that over short horizons, a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution may be appropriate. In our
view, this remark resonates introspectively, but is at the same time misleading since it confounds attitudes
regarding consumption and net income paths. In their model, consumption and net income were equiva-
lent; but our model allows saving and borrowing, and as a result a worker displays an inﬁnite elasticity of
substitution with respect to the timing of transfers.
9A Frechet distribution has some desirable properties in this environment. First, it displays positive
skewness. Second, suppose a worker receives n wage draws within a period from a Frechet distribution with
parameters (ˆ z,θ), and must decide whether to accept the maximum of these draws. The distribution of the




















Figure 2: Wage density: F ′(w) = θw−θ−1e−w−θ, θ = 103.56.
so we normalize by setting z = 1. The mean log wage draw is then
γ
θ, where γ ≈ 0.577 is
Euler’s constant, and the standard deviation of log wages is π √
6θ ≈ 1.28
θ .
Following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), we set θ so that the mean duration of an
unemployment spell is about ten weeks, consistent with evidence in Meyer (1990) on a
weekly job ﬁnding probability of 10 percent for the United States. This requires setting
θ = 103.56, giving a standard deviation of log wages of about 1.2 percent.10 Figure 2 plots
the density function F ′(w). We also consider the robustness of our results to changes in the
wage distribution, in particular to a substantial decrease in θ, which increases the dispersion
in wages, raising the option value of job search and the expected duration of unemployment.
It will be useful to have a way of comparing the cost or policy functions obtained from
our CRRA speciﬁcation with those obtained from the CARA case. To this end, note that
a worker with a constant coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ who consumes c has local
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion equal to σ/c. This suggests comparing the cost or policy
functions obtained for a CRRA worker with the approximation provided by those of a ﬁc-
titious CARA worker with coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion ρ = σ/u−1((1 − β)v), where
assumption that the worker gets one wage draw per period.
10Speciﬁcally, we chose θ so that a risk-neutral worker without unemployment insurance would have exactly
F( ¯ w) = 0.90, making use of equation (10).
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Figure 3: Diﬀerence between actual values and CARA approximations.
we take the consumption equivalent utility as a proxy for consumption. The approximations
can be computed analytically using our results from Section 3.
We begin by discussing our results for the minimum cost of providing a worker with
a given level of utility. Recall that with CARA utility, this cost is linear when utility is
measured in consumption equivalent units with a slope of 1+r
r ; see equation (19). For our
CRRA speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that the cost is nearly linear with almost the same slope. For
this reason, we do not graph the cost function. Instead, we compare the cost obtained from
the CRRA speciﬁcation with an approximation provided by the CARA exercise. The solid
black line in Figure 3 shows that the diﬀerence between C∗(v) and this CARA approximation
is small, less than 0.0001 in absolute value when utility exceeds a certainty equivalent of 0.3.
Turning to the optimal allocation and policy, the left panel in Figure 4 shows that, as a
function of the worker’s promised utility, unemployment consumption b is increasing (solid
brown line) while employment taxes τ are decreasing (dashed orange line). The right panel
shows how b and τ evolve over an unemployment spell starting with initial promised value
v0 = u(1.1)/(1−β). Although initially unemployment consumption is high and the employ-
ment tax is slightly negative, after a suﬃciently long unemployment spell the employment
tax rises to a high level and unemployment consumption falls to nearly zero. Putting these
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Figure 4: Optimal unemployment consumption bt, employment taxes τt, and unemployment





it is only slightly higher than, and would be scarcely distinguishable from, unemployment
consumption bt.
We also look at the subsidy to unemployment, the additional resources that a worker gets
by remaining unemployed for one more period, as previously deﬁned in equation (24). The
dash-dot blue line in Figure 4 shows that this unemployment subsidy is small when utility is
high at the start of an unemployment spell and then increases gradually as promised utility
falls and the spell continues. The dash-dot blue line in Figure 3 illustrates the high accuracy
for Bt of the CARA approximation with ρ = σ/u−1((1 − β)v).
The unemployment subsidy Bt paints a very diﬀerent picture of optimal unemploy-
ment insurance than do unemployment consumption bt or employment taxes τt in isola-
tion. The picture for bt and τt in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) is qualitatively simi-
lar. Werning (2002) computes the net subsidy to unemployment from their allocation and
ﬁnds that it is nearly constant, starting quite low and rising very slowly. This distinction
between unemployment consumption and subsidies is crucial in understanding the diﬀer-
ence between the results of this paper on the one hand, and Shavell and Weiss (1979) and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) on the other.





































Utility u−1((1 − β)v)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Time (weeks)
Figure 5: Optimal Job Finding Probability 1 − F(¯ wt).
F(¯ wt), under optimal unemployment insurance. This starts just above 10 percent per week
when promised utility is high, then initially rises before falling when promised utility is very
low. This non-monotonicity illustrates two opposing forces at play as the worker gets poorer:
the increase in absolute risk aversion and the increase in unemployment subsidies. The ﬁrst
eﬀect encourages the worker to accept more jobs, while the second eﬀect, which is partly
an endogenous response to the ﬁrst, encourages her to become more selective. The dashed
red line in Figure 3 shows the high accuracy of the CARA approximation. It follows that
the non-monotonicity of the job ﬁnding rate with respect to promised utility v found in our
CRRA speciﬁcation reﬂects a non-monotonicity with respect to risk aversion ρ in the CARA
case. The next subsection explores this notion further by studying the constant beneﬁts
policy with CRRA utility.
Before closing, it is important to emphasize that in this CRRA speciﬁcation, the prob-
ability that a worker remains unemployed for 100 weeks or more is remote, on the order of
10−5. Over the relevant time period, the unemployment subsidy and the job ﬁnding prob-
ability are virtually constant. In this sense, our results with CARA provide an excellent
benchmark for the CRRA speciﬁcation.
194.2 Constant Beneﬁts
The Bellman equation (2) describes the problem of an unemployed worker with assets a facing
a constant beneﬁt ¯ b and a constant employment tax ¯ τ. In addition, since consumption is
nonnegative, assets a′ cannot fall below some, possibly negative, level a, Aiyagari’s (1994)
natural borrowing limit. A worker can borrow as long as she can pay the interest on her
debt following any sequence of wage draws. The natural borrowing limit is
a = −
max{¯ b,w − ¯ τ}
r
= −
max{ ¯ B,w} − ¯ τ
r
.
Thus, the details of the natural borrowing limit depend on whether the smallest possible
wage, w, is bigger or smaller than the net unemployment beneﬁt, ¯ B ≡ ¯ b + ¯ τ.
In the ﬁrst case, w > ¯ B, and the natural borrowing limit is −
w−¯ τ
r , since a worker with
assets above this level could always have positive consumption and pay the interest on her
debt by taking the next job oﬀer. This implies that a change in the left tail of the wage
distribution can substantially aﬀect a worker’s debt limit, and potentially her behavior, even
if she is extremely unlikely ever to accept a wage from this part of the distribution.11
If w ≤ ¯ B, the natural borrowing limit is determined by a worker’s ability to use her
unemployment income to pay the interest on her debt, so a = −
¯ b
r. An increase in the net
unemployment beneﬁt, obtained by an increase in ¯ b and a budget balance change in ¯ τ, then
has two distinct eﬀects. It transfers income to states in which the worker does not ﬁnd a
job (insurance) and it allows the worker to go further into debt while she is unemployed
(liquidity). The liquidity eﬀect is absent from the model with CARA preferences because
there is no borrowing limit.
Appendix C discusses an eﬃcient method of solving the worker’s Bellman equation (2)
for Vu(a;¯ b; ¯ τ) and equation (3) S(a;¯ b, ¯ τ). It is then simple to choose ¯ b and ¯ τ to minimize
the total resource cost (1+r)a+S(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) of providing a worker with utility v = Vu(a;¯ b, ¯ τ).
We parameterize the economy as before: β = 0.999, σ = 1.5, F(w) = exp(−w−θ), and
θ = 103.56. Thus, we begin with a speciﬁcation where w = 0 ≤ ¯ B so that we are in the case
where beneﬁts aﬀect the borrowing constraint. In the next subsection we turn to the other
case.
To start, we examine the cost of providing the worker with a given level of utility. The-
oretically, this is higher than the cost under optimal unemployment insurance. Rather than
11With CARA preferences, Proposition 1 shows that the distribution of wages below the reservation wage











































Figure 6: Additional cost of constant beneﬁts.
showing the cost directly, the solid purple line in Figure 6 plots the additional cost of con-
stant beneﬁts on a logarithmic scale. At small values of utility, the cost of constant beneﬁts
is reasonably large, equal to a few weeks of consumption. But at high levels of utility, near
those corresponding to a net resource cost of zero, around v =
u(1.03)
1−β , the additional cost of
using a constant beneﬁts system is very small, about 0.01 weeks of consumption.
On the other hand, Figure 7 shows that the optimal constant unemployment subsidy ¯ B
for a worker who starts an unemployment spell with a given level of utility (solid purple
line) is typically much higher than the optimal time-varying unemployment subsidy ¯ Bt for
a worker with the same level of utility (dash-dot blue line). Workers with lower utility
demand higher beneﬁts for two reasons. First, they have higher absolute risk aversion, and
value insurance more. Second, relaxing the borrowing constraint is more important to them
because they are closer to it.
4.3 Liquidity
The goal of this section is to isolate the insurance role of unemployment beneﬁts. To do
this, ﬁrst observe that under the Frechet wage distribution F(w) = exp(−w−103.56), the















































r and ¯ B = ¯ b + ¯ τ.
Consider an economy very similar to this one but with the wage distribution ˜ F(w) = F(w)
if w ≥ w ≡ 0.95 and ˜ F(w) = 0 otherwise, i.e., with a (small) mass point at 0.95. It turns
out that the optimal reservation wage always exceeds 0.95 and this change has no eﬀect on
optimal unemployment insurance policy. But if in the original economy we had ¯ B < .95,
then the natural borrowing limit was −¯ b/r while in the modiﬁed economy it is −(w − ¯ τ)/r.
Thus, this slight change in the wage distribution may lead to a signiﬁcant increase in the
borrowing limit, i.e., in the availability of liquidity.
The green dashed lines in Figure 6 and Figure 7 show how this matters. When w >
¯ B, unemployment subsidies no longer play a role in increasing a worker’s liquidity. The
unemployment subsidy turns into a pure insurance mechanism and is much lower than with
w = 0. In fact, the optimal subsidy is only slightly higher than the optimal time-varying
unemployment subsidy at the same level of utility (dash-dot blue line), at least when utility
is high. For example, at v =
u(0.5)
1−β , the optimal time-varying subsidy is 0.0278, rising to
0.0283 during a ten-week unemployment spell. The optimal constant subsidy is 0.0288 if
w = 0.95 but 0.540 if w = 0. There is little need for time-varying unemployment subsidies
when w is high, and hence little additional cost of providing utility through a constant
subsidy (Figure 6).
A slight modiﬁcation in policy has an eﬀect that is similar to this change in technology.
22Suppose that after the worker draws a wage, she has the option of exiting the labor market
and collecting ˜ w− ¯ τ thereafter. She accepts this option if her reservation wage ¯ w falls below
˜ w.12 When this happens, the cost is
(1+r)( ˜ w−¯ τ)F( ˜ w)
r , since ˜ w must be paid in all future periods.
Like the lower bound on the wage distribution, this option can substantially aﬀect a
worker’s debt limit and her behavior even if she is extremely unlikely ever to exercise it.
The only diﬀerence is that the policy involves a cost to the planner, while the alternative
distribution does not. However, since the odds of getting a single wage draw below 0.95
are negligible, the odds of the worker ever accepting ˜ w and hence the cost of the policy are
inﬁnitesimal. This means that the cost and optimal unemployment subsidy under constant
beneﬁts are indistinguishable with ˜ w = 0.95 or with w = 0.95.
In summary, when the distribution of wages is such that workers have liquidity prob-
lems, optimal unemployment insurance is well-mimicked by a two-part policy: a subsidy to
unemployment, which insures workers against the failure to ﬁnd a good job; and measures
to ensure that workers are able to smooth their consumption over unusually long sequences
of bad wage draws. Insuring workers against the small probability of a very bad shock pro-
vides liquidity. Together the two policies mimic optimal unemployment insurance, which
involves a nearly constant unemployment subsidy for a long period of time, followed by a
sharp increase in the subsidy when workers are suﬃciently poor (Figure 4).
An open question is how to interpret the ﬁnding that raising the lower bound on the
wage distribution from 0 to 0.95 can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the constant beneﬁt policy
even if F(0.95) ≈ 10−88. In our view, it is a shortcoming of exogenous incomplete markets
models that vanishingly small probability events can signiﬁcantly aﬀect borrowing. On the
other hand, we view the simplicity and transparency of the exogenous incomplete market
model as a virtue.
4.4 Ad Hoc Borrowing Constraints
Although our analysis focuses on the natural borrowing limit, it is useful to note that pol-
icy can easily circumvent any tighter ad hoc limit. To be concrete, suppose borrowing is
prohibited but that the natural borrowing limit is negative, a < 0. Consider giving the
worker a lump-sum transfer −(1 + r)a at the start of the initial period, while lowering her
unemployment beneﬁt to ¯ b + ra and raising her employment tax to ¯ τ − ra. This simply
12In our numerical examples, a worker only accepts ˜ w if doing so is the only way she can pay the interest
on her debt.
23changes the timing of payments, and is equivalent to providing the worker with a risk-free
loan, but is an ideal instrument for circumventing any ad hoc borrowing constraint.
Optimal unemployment insurance, taken literally as a policy geared towards a hand-to-
mouth consumer, is also a loan. It pays out the duration-dependent sequence bt and collects
taxes τt (as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997). Figure 4 shows that the net subsidy Bt may be
much lower than consumption while unemployed, reﬂecting the accumulating employment
tax liability over the jobless spell. Thus, an important component of the agency’s gross
transfers are not net present value transfers; the agency pays out early on and collects later,
much as a loan.
For completeness, we also consider brieﬂy the case where, for some unspeciﬁed and ar-
bitrary reason, the insurance agency does not circumvent the ad hoc borrowing constraint.
This may signiﬁcantly aﬀect both the cost and level of optimal constant beneﬁts. To take
an extreme case, suppose a worker has no assets and no ability to borrow, so she must con-
sume her beneﬁt each period she is unemployed. We compute the optimal constant beneﬁt
and taxes for this case. The black dotted line in Figure 6 shows that this raises the cost of
providing the worker with a particular level of utility by about three to six weeks of income,
a substantial amount given that unemployment spells last for only ten weeks. The need
to provide both insurance and consumption smoothing makes the optimal unemployment
subsidy much higher, in excess of 0.5 over the usual range of utility (Figure 7).
4.5 Robustness
This section asks the extent to which our results depend on the wage distribution, in partic-
ular on the assumption that a worker ﬁnds a job in ten weeks on average. There are a few
reasons to explore this assumption. First, our results indicate that constant unemployment
beneﬁts and constant employment taxes do almost as well as a fully optimal unemployment
insurance policy. It could be that this result would go away if unemployment spells tended to
last longer and therefore presented a bigger risk to individuals. Second, in many countries,
notably much of Europe, unemployment duration is substantially longer, although this is
at least in part a response to unemployment beneﬁts that are high compared to workers’
income prospects (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). And third,
workers typically experience multiple spells of unemployment before locating a long-term job
(Hall, 1995). Although modeling this explicitly would go beyond the scope of this paper,
raising unemployment duration may capture some aspect of this longer job search process.
24To explore this possibility, we choose θ = 21.084 so that the weekly job ﬁnding probability
is about 1 − F(¯ w) = 0.020, one-ﬁfth of the earlier level.13 This raises the unconditional
standard deviation of wages, by a factor of ﬁve, to 0.027, which increases the option value
of job search. We revisit our main conclusions under this alternative parameterization:
• Under optimal unemployment insurance, the subsidy Bt rises slowly. Suppose we start
a worker with utility equal to a constant consumption of 1.2. The optimal subsidy is
0.080 and rises to 0.145 during the ﬁrst 10.75 years of unemployment, during which
time her utility falls in half, to a consumption equivalent of 0.6.
• The optimal job ﬁnding rate changes slowly. In the same experiment, it rises from
2.005 percent per week to 2.010 percent per week during the ﬁrst 10.75 years of unem-
ployment.
• The CARA case provides a good approximation. CARA would suggest an initial un-
employment subsidy of 0.084, rising to 0.156 when absolute risk aversion doubles. The
approximate and exact job ﬁnding probabilities are indistinguishable.
• If the lowest wage is high, here w = 1.03, the optimal constant subsidy is similar to the
optimal time-varying unemployment subsidy, 0.087 at the start of the unemployment
spell and 0.175 once the worker’s utility has fallen to 0.6. Moreover, the cost of constant
beneﬁts is small, approximately 0.0004 at the start and 0.017 for a worker with utility
0.6.
• If lowest wage is zero, the optimal constant unemployment subsidy is higher, 0.240 at
the start of the unemployment spell and 0.698 for a worker with utility of 0.6. The cost
of constant beneﬁts is also higher, 0.745 and 5.56 at these two utility levels. This last
number still only represents about a 1 percent increase in the cost of the unemployment
insurance system.
We have also examined the robustness of our results to higher risk aversion by setting
σ = 6. Optimal unemployment beneﬁts are higher than the benchmark with σ = 1.5, as the
CARA approximations would also suggest. For example, for a worker with utility equal to
u(1)/(1 − β), the optimal unemployment subsidy rises by a factor of four from 1.4 percent
to 5.5 percent. Otherwise this change in preferences has little eﬀect on our results.
13Speciﬁcally, we set θ to ensure that a risk-neutral worker without unemployment insurance would have
1 − F( ¯ w) = 0.020.
255 Conclusion
This paper characterizes optimal unemployment insurance in the McCall (1970) sequential
search model. Our main result is that with CARA preferences, constant beneﬁts coupled
with free access to borrowing and lending of a riskless asset is optimal. In particular, it
is ineﬃcient to distort the worker’s savings behavior. With CRRA preferences, the exact
optimality of constant beneﬁts breaks down. We ﬁnd that the optimal unemployment subsidy
rises very slowly over time. However, we ﬁnd little loss to a constant unemployment subsidy
if workers are given free access to enough liquidity. This quantitative result is robust to the
key parameters of the model.
There are important advantages to simple policies with free access to markets that our
model does not capture. Free choice of savings decisions may be intrinsically valuable for
philosophical reasons (Friedman, 1962; Feldstein, 2005). Such policies may also be valuable
on practical grounds because they are likely to be more robust to the numerous real-world
considerations that are not included in our model.
This paper has not focused on the optimal level of unemployment subsides, but rather
on their optimal timing and on the desirability of allowing workers free access to the asset
market. In the examples in this paper, the optimal unemployment subsidy turns out to be
low unless the worker’s utility is also quite low. They are not, however, out of line with
results in Gruber (1997), who computed beneﬁts somewhere between 0 and 10 percent of
wages to be optimal for the United States. Still, it is possible to construct examples where
the optimal unemployment subsidy is much higher.14 In ongoing separate work, we focus on
the determinants of the level of beneﬁts.
We have deliberately written a stark model of job search in order to keep the analysis
relatively simple and focus on the forces that we believe are most important. Nevertheless,
the model lends itself to a number of extensions, some of which we mention here. First,
to keep our analysis comparable to Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997), we have assumed that all jobs last forever. Relaxing this assumption permits an
examination of how optimal unemployment subsidies depend on a worker’s entire labor
market experience.15 Second, we have focused on deterministic unemployment insurance
14Suppose the wage draw can take on two values, w1 < w2. Moreover, suppose the ﬁrst-best features the
worker only accepting the high wage oﬀer. Then setting the unemployment subsidy to w2 has the desired
eﬀect and moreover fully insures the unemployed; it attains the ﬁrst-best and is thus optimal.
15Wang and Williamson (1996) and Zhao (2000) have explored optimal unemployment insurance, without
borrowing and saving, in an economy with repeated spells of unemployment.
26mechanisms. There are situations in which an employment lottery can reduce the cost
of optimal unemployment insurance even if workers have CARA or CRRA preferences.16
Future research should explore the potential gains from using employment lotteries and
their interpretation. Third, we have assumed that wage draws are independent over time.
By introducing some serial correlation, this model could potentially capture the idea that
some people are much more likely to obtain a high wage job quickly, while others learn
early on that a high wage is an unlikely event. Our results suggest that for these and other
extensions, it will be important to evaluate the relative eﬃciency of simple beneﬁt policies
coupled with free access to the asset market and to distinguish between insuring workers




This section uses the revelation principle to set up the most general deterministic mechanism
that an unemployment insurance agency might contemplate given the assumed asymmetry
of information. We allow the worker to make reports on the privately observed wage and we
allow taxes to vary during an employment spell. We show that neither of these capabilities
is useful: the planner does just as well by oﬀering unemployment beneﬁts that depend on
the duration of unemployment, and setting employment taxes that depend on the duration
of the previous unemployment spell, not on employment tenure.
A.1 The Recursive Mechanism
For notational convenience, we present the general mechanism directly in its recursive form—
this can be justiﬁed along the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987). Our general mechanism
involves the following steps:
1. The unemployed worker starts the period with some promise for expected lifetime
utility v.
16We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu for pointing out this possibility.
272. The worker then receives a wage oﬀer w from the distribution F(w) and makes a report
ˆ w to the planner.
3. If the worker reports ˆ w < ¯ w, she rejects the job, receives unemployment beneﬁt b(ˆ w),
and is promised continuation utility v′( ˆ w), starting the next period in step 1, described
above, with this value.
4. If the worker reports ˆ w ≥ ¯ w, she accepts the job and pays a tax τ( ˆ w,n) in each
subsequent period n = 1,2,....
A.2 The Planner’s Problem


















































nu(w − τ(w,n)) ≥ u(b( ˆ w)) + βv






nu(w − τ( ˆ w,n)) ˆ w ≥ ¯ w > w (27)
u(b(w)) + βv
′ (w) ≥ u(b( ˆ w)) + βv
′ ( ˆ w) ¯ w > w, ˆ w (28)
We proceed to simplify the planner’s problem.
Lemma 2 (a) Suppose an optimum has the schedules b(w) and v′(w), then the mechanism
that replaces these with a constant schedule b = b(ˆ w) and v′ = v′( ˆ w) for any ˆ w (with a slight
abuse of notation) is also optimal. (b) The incentive constraints (25)–(28) can be replaced






nu( ¯ w − τ( ¯ w,n)), (29)
and constraint (25).
Proof. (a) Condition (28) implies that u(b(w)) + βv′(w) = maxw≤ ¯ w(u(b(w)) + βv′(w)) ≡
x, independent of w. From the planner’s objective function we see that given x any
(b(w),v′(w)) ∈ argmaxb,v′{b + C(v′)} subject to u(b) + βv′ = x is optimal. Consequently,
one can select a solution that is independent of w.
(b) For constant b and v′, the constraint (28) is trivially satisﬁed. Since the right-hand






nu( ¯ w − τ( ˆ w,n))
for all ˆ w ≥ ¯ w. Constraint (25) implies ˆ w = ¯ w maximizes the right-hand side of this inequality,






nu( ¯ w − τ( ¯ w,n)). (30)




nu(w − τ(w,n)) ≥ u(b) + βv
′.












nu( ¯ w − τ( ¯ w,n)),
where the ﬁrst inequality uses (25) and the second uses monotonicity of the utility function.





nu( ¯ w − τ( ¯ w,n)) ≥ u(b) + βv
′. (31)
Inequalities (30) and (31) hold if and only if equation (29) holds, completing the proof.
29A.3 Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
So far we have not made any assumptions about the period utility function u except that it is
increasing. This section examines the implications of having constant absolute risk aversion
preferences.
Lemma 3 With CARA utility, an optimum must feature the tax on the employed τ(w,n)
being independent of w and n.
Proof. With exponential utility the w on both sides of (25) cancels, implying that the
remaining term
P∞
n=0 βnu(−τ(w,n)) must be some value independent of w. Let x denote



















The ﬁrst order condition for this problem reveals that an τ(w,n) must be independent of
(w,n).
Lemmas 2 and 3 allow us to rewrite the planning problem as in (6)–(8). Private informa-
tion prevents “employment insurance,” so the tax rate τ is independent of the wage. With
CARA preferences and jobs that last forever, the wage eﬀectively acts as a permanent multi-
plicative taste shock. This ensures that all employed workers have the same preferences over
transfer schemes, which makes it impossible to separate workers according to their actual
wages. Since workers have concave utility, introducing variability in taxes is not eﬃcient.
With non-CARA utility, workers with diﬀerent wages rank tax schedules diﬀerently. In
some cases, it may be possible to exploit these diﬀerences in rankings to separate workers
according to their wage; see Prescott and Townsend (1984) for an example. If workers have
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), including CRRA preferences, those earning lower
wages are more reluctant to accept intertemporal variability in taxes. One can therefore
induce these workers to reveal their wage by giving them a choice between a time-varying
employment tax with a low discounted cost and a constant tax with a high cost. High
wage workers would opt for the time-varying schedule. This does not, however, reduce
the planner’s cost of providing an unemployed worker with a given level of utility, since it
transfers income from low wage to high wage workers. It is therefore not optimal.
30B Proof of Proposition 1
The worker’s sequence problem implies that the value function must have the form Vu(a) =
u(ra − ¯ τ + k1)/(1 − β), for some constant k1. We determine this constant, and the rest of
the solution along with it.
The maximization with respect to consumption in equation (2) delivers
cu(a) = ra + (1 + r)
−1(r¯ b + k1 − ¯ τ) (32)




















This implies that the worker accepts all wages w exceeding a reservation wage ¯ w deﬁned
by ¯ w = (r ¯ B + k1)/(1 + r), where again ¯ B ≡ ¯ b + ¯ τ. Use this and the identity u(c1 + c2) =
−u(c1)u(c2) to write (33) as
Vu(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) = −















establishing equation (12). Substituting k1 = CE(¯ w) into equation (32), and ¯ w = (r ¯ B +
k1)/(1 + r) delivers equations (10) and (11).
C Computing the Worker’s Value Function
We are interested in solving equation (2). Ricardian equivalence implies that we can set the
employment tax ¯ τ to zero without loss in generality. First assume ¯ B ≥ w. It is numerically
impossible to work with the natural borrowing limit a = −
¯ B
r , and so instead we impose an
ad hoc borrowing constraint, a > −
¯ B
r . We consider values of a arbitrarily close to −
¯ B
r to
test the sensitivity of the results to the exact borrowing limit. The results we report in the
paper are not sensitive to this choice.
Take a worker with assets a very slightly greater than a0 ≡ a. A worker at this point will























ra0 + ¯ B
￿
F(¯ w0) + 1
1−β
R ∞
¯ w0 u(ra0 + w)dF(w)
1 − βF(¯ w0)
.
In addition, we can diﬀerentiate with respect to a using the envelope condition and evaluate
at a to get
V
′













where we use 1 − β = r
1+r to simplify the expression.
Next, for any n ≥ 1, we deﬁne recursively an, Vu(an), and V ′
u(an). Let an be the highest









which uniquely deﬁnes an since u′ is decreasing and V ′




(1 + r)an + ¯ B − an−1
￿
+ βVu(an−1) =
u(ran + ¯ wn)
1 − β
,















and, using the envelope theorem again, its derivative solves
V
′













For each level of assets an, we can also compute the expected discounted cost of the







F( ¯ w0) =
(1 + r) ¯ BF(¯ w0)










The cost of providing the worker with utility Vu(an) is (1+r)an +sn. We interpolate this to
compute the cost at arbitrary utility levels and choose unemployment beneﬁts ¯ B to minimize
cost.
Next consider w > ¯ B, so accepting any job is the worker’s best option. A worker’s assets
cannot fall below −
w
r . In fact, if a worker who ends one period with assets a < −
w+r ¯ B
r(1+r)
remains unemployed, her assets the following period are no higher than a′ = (1 + r)a +
¯ B < −
w
r , a violation of the borrowing constraint. Thus the natural borrowing limit is
a0 = a = −
w+r ¯ B
r(1+r). Below this point a worker must accept any job. Vu(a0) and V ′
u(a0) are
slightly changed by this constraint:
Vu(a0) =
R ∞











The cost of a worker at the borrowing limit is zero, since she accepts any job. Given these
initial conditions, an, Vu(an), V ′
u(an), and sn are deﬁned using the same inductive formulae
as before.
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